I was wrong... no. 1

Really good point circulating in the econ blogosphere, Fessing up to Mistakes

I ought to admit when I'm wrong, partly because I value honesty and partly because it makes it easier to correct my mistakes.

Or maybe I just don't want to look stupid:

because people who hold heterodox opinions are just confused

Specifically: I ought to admit to holding mutually inconsistent opinions or reconcile apparently contradictory positions by reexamining and reformulating my statements of belief.

first one I can think of:

0: "Just because everyone's doing it, doesn't make it right" (I've heard various, extremely colorful variations on this, but I'm representing the condensed and umm, sanitized version....)

1: Or the bayesian-thingy...'Since you can't hope to arrive at every answer by yourself, it's best to rely on information collated and interpreted by experts, by compiling information and giving greater weight to the views of other better informed people, you should arrive at the best understanding of the situation possible.'

I think this can be pretty easily reconciled, since '0' concerns people ("who should know better" or relative experts) who are not merely listening to a majority, but an ill-informed, unwise majority.

...but if you're incompetent (relatively or absolutely,) how will you know if your assessment of other people's expertise is even remotely accurate?

I don't think that you can hope to consistently arrive at a better answer (i.e. without guessing) than the 'best experts,' you still need new information. Of course you learn from other people, anyone will admit that; I don't know that there are very many people who want to try and develop thousands of years worth of accumulated knowledge ex nihilo. My conclusion, they're both wrong (I have to wait for quantum computing to develop.)

This is already too long (meaning: I can't think of anything else right now, so I'm going to try to back out of this gracefully,) but this is probably the first of a series; considering that it's highly unlikely that I'm going to stop making mistakes, and even less unlikely that I'm going to stop blabbing about them ("a fool flaunts his folly.")

Homo Hypocriticus (why lie?)

Robin Hanson's homo hypocriticus has something missing---- I don't know what to call it, but it's missing.....
False but non-detrimental-signaling (just rolls off the tongue doesn't it?)
Self-evaluation bias, perhaps? If someone believes they are a good person and attributes their actions to an altruistic motive, this may not be accurate, but is consistent with their other delusions (everyone being smarter, more attractive and a better astrophysicist than average.)

 Maybe, some people do X because of Y (i.e. are "genuine,") then because other people want to be trusted (Z) they do Y.  If the Z'rs don't break faith on other matters, their usurpation of the title X'rs might not be believed, but it may increase trust (which in turn could improve the outcome of interactions, and feeds into the "X  fantasy")

Such lies may not increase productivity or societal stability, but they are easier to "maintain" than the truth, perhaps that partially explains the pervasive errors in determining causality.